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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
-r.1 • *.•« r, * x. CASE NO. 
Plaintiff-Respondent,
 m 141^0 
-vs~ 
WILLIE FOLKES, : 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crime of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (Heroin) with intent 
to distribute for value, a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (i) (ii) (as amended, 1973). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury on 
November 12, 1974, before the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
of the Third Judicial District Court. Appellant was 
sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison 
as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision 
of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 26, 1974, two 
policemen (Officers Bell and Niemann) were stationed 
on the roof of the Rio Grande Products Building for the 
purpose of observing prostitution activity on West Second 
South. The officers were on the roof by permission of 
the owners of the building (T. 33). While in the process 
of observation, Officer Bell heard voices from a window 
of the Baywood Hotel. These voices were discussing heroin 
and "shooting up". At the same time the officer observed 
a hand reach out underneath a window, holding a syringe. 
A clear liquid was expelled from the syringe (T. 33). 
The Baywood Hotel is adjacent to and connected with the 
Rio Grande Building (T. 143,144,33). After motioning to 
his companion to join him, the officer approached the 
window and observed the following activity. 
Appellant came out of the bedroom of the two-
room apartment (T. 34) and into the kitchen with a small 
amber bottle. From it he produced two capsules which he 
sold to a woman who was in the kitchen (T. 36,37). That 
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woman, with the help of another woman present, emptied 
the contents of the capsules into a spoon and added 
some water. This mixture was heated and was drawn 
into a syringe. Finally each woman injected a portion 
of the substance into the other's arm. The women then 
left (T. 37,38). 
The police observed appellant return the small 
amber bottle to the bedroom (T. 39). A short time later 
appellant again went into the bedroom and brought out the 
bottle. He took one capsule from it and gave it to a 
man in the kitchen (T. 39). This man then followed the 
same procedure as the women had done (T. 39). The police 
a second time observed appellant return the bottle to 
the bedroom (T. 40). Officer Bell had seen the bottle 
at all times, however Officer Niemann, because of his 
vantage point had not. Officer Bell motioned to his 
campanion and mouthed the words that appellant was 
taking the evidence into the bedroom. Officer Niemann 
responded by nodding his head up and down (T. 66,67). 
The officers inadvertantly made a noise and 
appellant got up to investigate. Appellant went into 
the bedroom where the bottle was and there he looked 
out the window. Officer Niemann aimed his gun at him 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and told him not to move (T. 40). The other man, 
who was still in the kitchen made a move for the 
door. Officer Bell, however, stuck his revolver 
through the kitchen screen and ordered the man to 
remain still (T. 41). Officer Niemann then climbed in 
the bedroom window and accompanied appellant into the 
kitchen where he could keep his eye on both men. 
When the situation was thus secured Officer Bell also 
climbed in the bedroom window (T. 41). After the men the 
were handcuffed Officer Niemann returned to the bed-
room and retrieved the small amber bottle which Officer 
Bell had observed appellant put there (T. 43). 
POINT I 
POLICE OFFICERS HAVE A RIGHT AND A DUTY TO 
INVESTIGATE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY WHICH MAY INVOLVE 
CRIMINAL ACTION. 
Appellant contends that police may not spy 
on people and that people must be protected from invasions 
of their right to privacy in their homes. Respondent 
admits as much. However, respondent submits, the above 
has absolutely nothing to do with this case. Appellant 
cites Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and other 
similar cases as authority for the position that eaves-
-4-
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dropping without a search warrant by peering in a window 
is a violation of the right to privacy. Respondent 
submits however, that there are overridding considera-
tions. In the light of all of the facts and cir- , 
cumstances, this is not a Katz case at all, rather it is 
a Terry v. Ohio case. (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
Terry stands for the proposition that a police officer 
can and should investigate suspicious circumstances 
in order to prevent or curtail criminal activity. 
Terry v. Ohio, respondent submits, is controlling in this 
case. 
As this Court is aware, Terry involved a situation 
where a police officer observed some young men walking 
up and down a street in Cleveland, Ohio. He felt that 
the situation "didn't look right to me." He further 
watched the men who would walk up and down the street, 
always looking in a certain store. The officer then 
approached the men, asked a question to which he received 
no response, and conducted a search. Finding a gun, 
he then arrested the men (392 U.S. 5-7). 
The men sought to have the gun supressed 
because the search was allegedly an invasion of their 
-5-
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right to privacy. The Supreme Court, however, upheld 
the search. Their reasoning is as follows. The Court 
first specifically said that Terry was not a Katz type 
case: 
"We deal here with an entire rubric 
of police conduct - necessarily swift 
action predicated upon the on-the-spot 
observations of the officer on the 
beat - which historically has not been,-
and as a practical matter could not be, 
subjected to the warrant procedure." 
(392 U.S. at 20). 
The Court then went on to outline the test to be applied 
to the officer's conduct. The officer must be able to 
point to specific and articuable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences of these facts, reasonably 
warrant an intrusion. (392 U.S. at 21). In other words: 
"Would the facts available to the 
officer at the moment of the seizure or 
the search 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief1 that the action 
taken was appropriate?" (3 92 U.S. 
21-22). 
Applying this law to the facts of the instant 
case, it is obvious that Officer Bell's actions in 
investigating a suspicious activity was both prudent and 
constitutionally acceptable. The officer was in a place 
where he had a right to be (T. 33). A short distance away 
was an open window of a hotel room. From that window 
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the officer overheard people talking about "shooting 
up heroinM. (T. 33). He also saw a hand extend out the 
window holding a syringe. A clear liquid was emitted 
from the syringe. This later act happened twice (T. 33)* 
Based on the above occurances the officer made 
the decision to investigate further. Respondent submits 
that it would be inconceivable for a police officer with 
four years of experience (T. 31) to shut his mind to 
a circumstance so patently suspicious as that just 
described. As an officer of the peace he had a legal 
duty to investigate. 
It is helpful to compare the knowledge of the 
officer in the Terry case to that of Officer Bell. In 
Terry the policeman merely saw some men walking up and 
down a street looking suspiciously in a store window. 
On the other hand Officer Bell heard individuals actually 
discussing the commission of a crime, "shooting up heroin". 
Further, he not only heard those words but at the same 
time he saw a hand holding a syringe. Officer Bell, armed 
with a great deal of probable cause, had the full right 
if not the moral duty to investigate. 
Appellant characterizes this as a case where 
his actions were: 
_ - 7 _ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
" . . . private conversations and 
activities. . . within the confines 
of his private residence [which] 
were not exposed to the public and 
were preserved as private." 
Respondent submits that the facts do not justify such 
a characterization. If it was a private conversation 
why was the window left open? Further, the hand and the 
syringe were extended out of the window and into the 
"plain view" of an officer who had a right to be where 
he was. 
Appellant's entire authority can be distinguished 
thus, on the basis that in none of his cited cases was 
an officer drawn to ongoing suspicious activity which he 
inadvertantly discovers. In Katz, supra, and State v. Kent, 
20 U.2d 1, 432 P.2d 64 (1967), as well as the other cases 
cited by appellant, a police officer, without a search 
warrant, specifically set up an eavesdropping type of 
surveiliince the main target of which was a certain in-
dividual. The burden of those cases is that if an 
officer had time to set up the eavesdrop, then he had time to 
obtain a warrant, and that a warrant would not be issued 
if it would be used to invade a place where a person had 
reasonably expected privacy. 
Katz and the others do not stand for the proposition 
of appellant, that a police officer is not entitled to 
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investigate suspicious activity simply because he sees 
it or hears it from a private residence. Appellant would 
suggest that if a policeman heard a scream for help, 
he could not climb up a fire escape and look through 
a window to see what the trouble was. This however, 
is not the law. 
In summary, when a policeman inadvertantly 
sees and hears suspicious activity, he has the right, 
under Terry v. Ohio, to investigate. 
POINT II 
THE SEIZURE OF THE HEROIN WAS LEGALLY ACCOM-
PLISHED. 
In the instant case, police observed the follow-
ing take place in a small two-room apartment (T. 34). 
Appellant came out of the bedroom and into the kitchen 
with a small amber bottle. From it he produced two 
capsules which he sold to a woman who was in the kitchen 
(T. 36,37). That woman, with the help of another woman 
present, emptied the contents of the capsules into a 
spoon and added some water. This mixture was heated and 
then drawn into a syringe. Finally each woman injected 
a portion of the substance into the others arm. The 
women then left (T. 37,38). 
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The police observed appellant return the small 
amber bottle to the bedroom (T. 39). A short time later 
appellant again went into the bedroom and brought out 
the bottle. He took one capsule from it and gave it 
to a man in the kitchen (T. 39). This man then followed 
the same procedure as the women had done (T. 39). The 
police again observed appellant return the bottle to 
the bedroom (T. 40). 
After the police inadvertantly made a noise 
outside the window appellant got up to investigate. 
Appellant went into the bedroom where the bottle was and 
looked out the window (T. 40). Officer Niemann pointed 
his revolver at appellant and told him to stand still 
(T. 40). The other man, who was still in the kitchen 
made a move toward the door. Officer Bell, however, 
stuck his revolver through the kitchen screen and ordered 
the man to remain in the kitchen (T. 41). Officer 
Niemann climbed in the bedroom window and accompanied 
appellant into the kitchen where he could keep his eye 
on both men. When the situation was secured in this 
way, Officer Bell also climbed through the bedroom window 
(T. 41). After the men were searched and handcuffed one 
officer returned to the bedroom to retrieve the small amber 
bottle which they had observed appellant put there (T. 43) . 
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Appellant argues that the actual arrest was 
in the kitchen and therefore the seizure of the heroin-
filled bottle was illegal as being outside appellant's 
control. Respondent submits, however, that if the 
retrival of the bottle constituted a search at all then 
it was lawful on either of two exceptions to the warrant 
requirement: search incident to arrest and plain view. 
Respondent points out that the arrest occurred in the 
bedroom placing the bottle easily within appellant's 
control. Also, since the seizure of the bottle did not 
constitute a wide-ranging exploratory type search it 
is legally permissible under the circumstances. 
A. There Was No Search In This Case • 
The facts show that the officers personally 
witnessed a crime. One of them personally observed the 
bottle from which the heroin was taken. They saw where 
the appellant kept the bottle. Therefore, after the 
arrest they simply picked up the bottle as evidence. There 
was no search. The officer knew what was in the bedroom 
and merely picked it up as evidence. It is absurd to 
suggest that a search warrant was necessary in this case. 
If the police officers had accosted appellant in the 
kitchen and had seen him toss a bottle into the other 
room, there is no doubt but that they could go and pick 
it up. They would not have to get a warrant merely because 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the evidence was in that manner placed out of appellantfs 
reach. It is the same in this case except that the bottle 
was placed in the bedroom right before the arrest in-
stead of right afterward. Appellant would have this 
Court illogically restrict the police from doing that 
which is dictated by common sense. Appellant's proposals 
are directly contrary to the public interest. 
B. The Seizure Is Permissible Under The "Plain 
View" Doctrine. 
Respondent refers the Court to the third point in 
this brief for a discussion of the "plain view" doctrine. 
Suffice it to say, at this point that while observing . 
the drug sale the police were in a place where they had 
a right to bef the amber bottle was in plain view, the 
discovery was inadvertant, and its incriminating nature 
was immediately apparent. Therefore, the officers had 
a right to seize the bottle notwithstanding the fact 
they lost visual contact with it for a moment. 
C. Even If There Was A Search, It Was Permissible 
Under Chimel Standards. 
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), 
the United States Supreme Court said that in connection 
with a lawful arrest, police officers are justified in 
searching the area surrounding the arrestee from which he 
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might gain possession of a weapon or destroy evidence 
(395 U.S. at 763). The Court also said that the extent 
of the search must be "tied to and justified" by the 
circumstances of the arrest (395 U.S. at 762). Respondent 
submits that the "search" in this case, if it can be 
called that, was justified by the circumstances of 
the arrest. Also the arrest occurred in the bedroom 
and not in the kitchen. Therefore, the seizure of the 
bottle is permissible. 
As indicated supra, Chimel holds that the 
extent of a search incident to arrest is to be justified 
by the circumstances of the case. The Utah Supreme Court 
also adheres to this position. In State v. Farnsworth, 
30 U.2d 439, 519 P.2d 244 (1974), this Court said: 
"The question to be answered is 
whether under the circumstances the 
search or seizure is one which fair 
minded persons, knowing the facts, and 
giving due consideration to the rights 
and interests of the public, as well 
as to those of the suspect, would judge 
to be an unreasonable or oppressive 
intrusion against the latterfs rights." 
(30 U.2d at 438-439) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, in determining whether a search is valid, 
the trier of facts must give due consideration to the 
circumstances of the case. The fact finder must then 
-13-
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aPPly a balancing test with the rights and interests 
of the public being weighed against those of a defendant. 
In this case, it is submitted that the circumstances 
overwhelmingly suggested that a seizure of the bottle 
was legal, if not logically mandated. Further this 
very brief and minor intrusion on appellant's rights 
carries insignificant weight as opposed to the rights 
and interests of the public. . 
People v. Concepcion, 341 N.E. 2d 823 (New York 
197 5) is very similar to the instant case. There, two 
undercover agents knew from personal observation that 
a bartender kept narcotics in a refrigerator, and that 
he sold drugs to patrons of his tavern. The police 
confronted the man, had him open the refrigerator, at 
which time they seized its contents. The New 
York Courts of Appeals said: 
"We conclude that the courts below 
could properly have found that the 
search and seizure were properly con-
ducted; that 'there was not a wide-
ranging, exploratory, rummaging, or 
routine search of the character con-
demned in Chimel. . . .r" ( 341 N.E. 
2d at 824) . 
This logic applies to the present case. In Chimel a 
defendant was arrested and then police went through 
-14-
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his whole house looking for incriminating materials. 
Drawers were opened, closets, boxes, etc. The search 
included everything. However, in the present case, as 
in Concepcion, the officers knew right where to go to get 
the evidence. There was nothing but the slightest of 
intrusions on appellant's rights. 
Finally, appellant was arrested in the bedroom, 
not in the kitchen, therefore the seizure of the bottle 
is valid. In People v. Hall, 226 N.W. 2d 562 (Michigan 
1975), a man was ordered by a police officer to get out 
of a car. He did, whereupon the arrest was completed and 
he was handcuffed. Then the officers went back and seized 
a packet in the car. The Court held that the seizure 
was okay since: 
"We do not deem the slight change 
in defendant's position with regard to 
the packet as significant since the 
packet was obviously within the zone 
of defendant's immediate physical control 
at the time the police began arresting 
him, which is the crucial point of 
reference for Chimel. (226 N.W.2d 
at 563). (original emphasis). 
Likewise, in the present case, the arrest started in the 
bedroom. That is where the officer pointed his gun at 
appellant and ordered him to freeze. The arrest was not 
placing of handcuffs on the appellant. Rather, it occurred 
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when he was restricted so that he knew he was not free 
to leave. Henry v. State, 494 P.2d 661 (Okla. Cxi, 
1972), State v. Sullivan, 395 P.2d 745 (Wash. 1964), 
State v. Vaughn, 471 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1970), State v. 
Frazier, 537 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1975), Rodarte v. City of 
Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1976). Therefore, since 
the arrest was in the bedroom, the bottle could be seized. 
This position was espoused in State v. Noles, 546 P.2d 
814 (Ariz. 1976). A man was arrested while lying on a 
a motel room bed. He was then handcuffed and placed on 
the floor and surrounded by four police officers. An 
officer than went over to a nightstand and found a gun 
in the drawer. The court sustained the validity of 
the search since the nightstand had been "within the 
immediate control of the defendant at the time of arrest." 
(at 817-818). Likewise, in the instant case, the officer 
could go and get the bottle at the original location of 
the arrest although the defendant had been handcuffed 
and moved a few feet. • 
In summary, Respondent submits that under the 
circumstances the seizure was valid. A very brief and 
slight intrusion on appellant's rights was more than 
justified by the facts known by the officers. This slight 
-16-
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intrusion was heavily outweighed by the rights of the 
people of the State of Utah.' The decision of the lower 
court, validating the seizure, should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE SEIZURE OF AND INTRUSION INTO THE BOTTLE 
WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court have said that contraband which is 
in plain view may be seized by police. State v. Sims, 
30 U.2d 251, 516 P.2d 354 (1973), and Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 402 U.S. 443 (1971). However, four conditions 
must be met: (1) the officer must be lawfully present 
where the search and seizure takes place; (2) the discovery 
must be "inadvertant"; (3) the seizable object must 
be in plain view; and (4) its incriminating nature must 
be immediately apparent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra, and Ringle, Searches, Seizures, Arrests and 
Confessions, Section 162 (1975 Supp. at 94). 
Respondent submits that all of the above re-
quirements were met and that the seizure of the bottle 
was legally accomplished. 
First, the officers were lawfully present when 
they saw the amber bottle in plain view. They were on 
-17-
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the roof of the Rio Grande Products Building, by 
permission, to watch for illegal prostitution activity 
on Second South (T. 33). Second, the discovery was 
inadvertant. The Baywood Hotel physically adjoins 
the Rio Grande Building and the Hotel has windows on the 
adjoining side (T. 143-144, 33). As one officer was 
walking on the roof of the Rio Grande Building he 
heard voices talking about "shooting up" heroin. Then 
he observed a hand reach underneath a window holding 
a syringe. A clear liquid was squirted out of the 
syringe (T. 33). 
Third, the seizable object must be in plain 
view. After observing and hearing apparently illegal 
activity the officer looked into the window and saw 
the bottle in plain view (T. 36). Fourth, the 
incriminating nature of the bottle was immediately 
apparent. Capsules were taken from the amber bottle, 
opened and the contents was injected into the arms 
of persons present (T. 37). Thus, all of the requirements 
of the plain view doctrine are satisfied. Therefore, 
when the officers entered the apartment, they seized 
the. small amber bottle from the place where they had 
observed appellant put it. 
-18-
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All the authority used by appellant does 
not apply to this case for the simple reason that he 
views the actions from a much too narrow scope. If 
extended, his argument is that if the police eye-contact 
with an incriminating item is ever broken, plain view 
is lost. This is not the law. In People v. Hauschel, 
550 P.2d 876 (Colo. 1976), police officers viewed in-
criminating items in "plain view" but did not seize them. 
Then, about 12 hours later that same day, the items were 
seized. The court sustained the seizure even though eye-
contact with the incriminating evidence was disrupted 
for an extensive period. In the instant case, the 
incriminating evidence was viewed and a right to seize 
it was established prior to the officers ever entering 
the apartment. The bottle was merely sitting on a 
dresser in the bedroom and one officer there retrieved 
it (T. 84). 
Further, the bottle wasn't just an innocent 
looking bottle as appellant alleges. The officers had 
personally observed people inject the contents of that 
bottle into their arms (T. 37). 
Finally, appellant claims that although one 
officer knew all about the bottle, the second didnft 
and it was this latter officer that seized the bottle. 
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Appellant argues that since the knowing officer didn't 
communicate his knowledge to the seizing officer, the 
latter must have randomly seized the bottle. Respondent, 
however, directs the Court to the testimony of Officer 
Bell-
"Q. [by Defense Council] Had you 
made any comment prior to [the 
arrest] to Mr. Niemann about the 
amber bottle, or had he made any 
comment to you about it? 
A. Yes, I made the comment to him 
about it. 
Q. Prior to entering the room? 
A. Oh yes. 
Q. What comment had you made to him? 
A. Well, as we were motioning as he 
brought the bottle into the room, I 
just mouthed the words he was taking 
it to the bedroom and pointed to the 
bedroom like this (indicating), and 
he nodded up and down. We didn't 
converse too much out there on the 
ledge between the two of us. (T. 66,67). 
Respondent must admit that the other officer was less 
than sure about whether or not he was told of the amber 
bottle. His testimony was that he simply could not 
remember. 
"Q. Prior to [seizing] the amber bottle 
of pills, did you have any knowledge 
of it whatsoever? 
A. I don't recall if Don mentioned it 
to me as we went in or not. I know I 
didn't see it before entering, but I 
really can't remember if he told me 
that it was there or if I just visually 
observed it and picked it up." (T. 96)• Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In other words, one officer remembered 
the conversation and the other officer didn't. The 
evidence is a matter for the trier of facts and its 
weight is to be determined by him. State v. Mills, 
530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975), Fritz v. State, 554 P.2d 
819 (Colo. 1976). On appeal the evidence must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State 
v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208 at 214, 357 P.2d 183 (1960), 
State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 106 (1959). 
In other words, unless there is a clear showing of lack 
of evidence, the decision of the lower court must be 
affirmed. State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). 
Finally, even if the seizing officer (Niemann) 
didn't fully comprehend what he had seized, it is 
nothing more than harmless error since Officer Bell 
probably would have retreived the bottle if his partner 
had not already done so. 
In summary, since the "plain view" exception to 
the search requirement is satisfied, the seizure of the 
amber bottle should be sustained. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the arguments presented 
above, it is urged that this Court affirm appellant's 
conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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